Constitutional Law -- Prior Restraint Enforced Against Publication of Classified Material by CIA Employee by Eagle, Kenneth L.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 51 | Number 4 Article 10
3-1-1973
Constitutional Law -- Prior Restraint Enforced
Against Publication of Classified Material by CIA
Employee
Kenneth L. Eagle
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation




Constitutional Law-Prior Restraint Enforced Against Publication of
Classified Material by CIA Employee
The "right to know" is in a period of gestation. . . . [P]eople will
increasingly insist upon knowing what their government is doing and
* , * because this knowledge is vital to government by the people, the
"right to know" will grow.'
The public's "right to know" is dependent upon the free exercise
of the first amendment freedoms of speech and press. This right seem-
ingly received strong reaffirmance in New York Times Co. v. United
States,2 when the Supreme Court dissolved a preliminary injunction
which had prohibited the New York Times and Washington Post from
publishing excerpts from a classified Pentagon study of United States
policy decisions in Vietnam. However, the scope of the Pentagon Papers
case has recently been narrowed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Marchetti,3 in which the court affirmed the
issuance of an injunction enforcing a secrecy agreement which had been
exacted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from an employee as
a condition of employment.
4
Before Victor Marchetti began working for the CIA in 1955 he was
required to sign a secrecy agreement in which he promised not to divulge
any classified information, intelligence, or knowledge concerning the
present and future security of the United States, except in the perform-
ance of his official duties, unless specifically authorized in writing by the
CIA Director or his authorized representative.' After his resignation in
1969 Marchetti published a novel and a magazine article critical of some
policies and practices of the CIA.' In March of 1972 he submitted to
Esquire magazine and six other publishers an article in which he related
some of his experiences as an agent.
7
'United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (4th Cir.) (Craven, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 93 S. Ct. 553 (1972).
2403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). This case is commonly known and will hereinafter be
referred to as the Pentagon Papers case.
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After learning of this, the United States, alleging that the article
contained classified information concerning intelligence sources, meth-
ods, and operations, sought an injunction to enforce the secrecy agree-
ment.8 The district court granted the injunction and ordered Marchetti
to submit all writings to the CIA Director for prior approval and not
to release, without prior Agency approval, any writing relating to the
Agency or to intelligence.' The Fourth Circuit upheld the substance of
the district court decree but limited the requirement of prior approval
to the release of classified material.'0 The decision further provided that
the CIA must respond within thirty days after submission of material
for approval and that Marchetti would be entitled to judicial review of
any CIA denial of publication approval." However, the burden of ob-
taining such review would be on Marchetti. The issues on review would
be limited to whether or not the information were classified, and if so,
whether or not it had previously been disclosed to the public.'
Any consideration of the doctrine of prior restraint 3 should begin
with Near v. Minnesota,4 the landmark case in this area. Near involved
a statute which provided for the "abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
'malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or other
periodical.' "15 Whenever such nuisance existed, an appropriate public
official, or a citizen if such official took no action, could maintain an
action to perpetually enjoin the persons committing the nuisance from
further maintaining it." In declaring the statute unconstitutional the
Supreme Court held that the chief purpose of the first amendment
guarantee is to prevent prior restraints upon publication, and that while
such protection is not "absolutely unlimited," limitations have been
recognized only in "exceptional cases."' 7
1d. at 1311, 1313.
'Id. at 1311.
"Id. at 1311, 1318.
"Id. at 1317.
"Id. at 1317-18. Judge Craven concurred in the court's decision, but disagreed that the scope
of judicial review should be so limited, preferring not to foreclose inquiry into whether or not
secrecy classifications are reasonable. Id. at 1318-19.
'-The doctrine of prior restraint has been defined as holding that the first amendment prohib-
its governments from imposing any system of prior restraint, with certain limited exceptions, in
any area of expression within the boundaries of the amendment. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
14283 U.S. 697 (1931).
111d. at 701-02.
"Id. at 702-03.
"I1d. at 713, 716. "Exceptional cases" mentioned by the Court included enforcements against
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The Court in Near was highly suspicious of any restraint that
would eliminate or decrease criticism of public officials. 8 This concern
has broadened, and the doctrine of prior restraint has been applied to
subsequent cases involving licensing statutes that have required the ac-
quisition of a permit from a public official prior to the exercise of first
amendment rights. Fearing arbitrary denials of licenses by officials who
might base their decisions on the content of the intended expression, the
Court has overturned statutes and ordinances which have not contained
adequate guidelines for implementation. On the other hand, the Court
has upheld narrowly drawn statutes with explicit standards based upon
the time, place, and manner of the intended expression.
20
Similarly, prior restraints in the area of obscenity have been scruti-
nized in order to avoid suppression of expression protected by the first
amendmentY.2 In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown2 1 the Court upheld a
statute which authorized a municipality to enjoin the sale and distribu-
tion of written and printed material that had been found at a trial to be
obscene. This case was distinguished from Near because the statute was
directed solely at obscenity and imposed no restraint upon materials not
already published and found to be obscene.
23
Censorship of motion pictures has presented its own unique prob-
lems. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago24 the Court refused to
establish a general rule that movie censorship statutes are unconstitu-
tional per se, and said: "It has never been held that liberty of speech is
absolute. Nor has it been suggested that all previous restraints on speech
obscene publications, government actions to prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting services
or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops, and
government actions to protect against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force
of orderly government. Id. at 716.
18d. at 710, 713.
"E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (use of sound amplification devices); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (distribution of religious literature).
2 E.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941) (parade permits).
"In light of the definition of the doctrine of prior restraint in note 13 supra, it may at first
seem meaningless to discuss prior restraint in relation to obscenity, which is unprotected by the
first amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). However, because of the Fourth
Circuit's reliance in Marchetti upon a movie censorship case in establishing safeguards, 466 F.2d
at 1317, such discussion can be helpful. Besides, if one adheres to the "absolutist" first amendment
philosophy, obscenity deserves as much protection as anything else. Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, 61-62 (1965) (Douglas, J., concurring).
n354 U.S. 436 (1957).
1id. at 445.
2365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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are invalid. '2 5 Subsequently, in Freedman v. Maryland,2 however, par-
ticular features of a Maryland statute were challenged. There the Court
found the prior restraint invalid because the absence of appropriate
procedural safeguards produced a danger of undue suppression of pro-
tected as well as unprotected expressionY.
2
The history of prior restraint consists primarily of statutory enact-
ments that have infringed upon first amendment rights. Unprecedented,
therefore, was the government's attempt in the Pentagon Papers case
to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publish-
ing the contents of a classified study of United States policy decisions
in Vietnam.2 On the surface, at least, the decision in that case seemed
to give the doctrine of prior restraint its greatest impetus in forty years.
The Supreme Court, in denying the injunction, ruled that "[any system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity" and that the United
States had failed to carry its burden of showing justification for such
restraint.29 There were, however, six concurring and three dissenting
opinions, and the exact legal principles of the decision are difficult to
determine.
30
Although the competing interests of governmental secrecy and first
amendment freedoms were very similar in Marchetti and the Pentagon
Papers case, the respective courts reached opposite conclusions. In the
Pentagon Papers case there was no explicit statement as to why the
government had failed to overcome the presumption against prior re-
straints, and the injunction was denied. In Marchetti no explicit state-
ment can be found as to how the government met its heavy burden, yet
the injunction was granted.
The Fourth Circuit relied upon three major factors in implicitly
establishing that the presumption against prior restraint had been over-
come. First, the court found that the Constitution,'3 Supreme Court
21fd. at 47.
26380 U.S. 51 (1965).
21d. at 60. The procedural safeguards required by the Court to accompany a system of prior
submission to a censor included (1) placing the burden of proving the film is obscene on the censor,
(2) assuring the right to a final judicial determination on the merits, and (3) prompt judicial review.
Id. at 58-59.
21403 U.S. at 714.
29Id.
'Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers,
120 U. PA. L. REv. 271 (1971).
3 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
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decisions," and history33 have clearly established the government's
right to "internal secrecy about the conduct of governmental affairs in
areas in which disclosure may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent
with the national interest."34 The court correctly noted that nothing in
the Constitution requires the government to divulge information. The
historical development of the use of "executive privilege" in refusing to
disclose information to Congress can be justified on a separation-of-
powers theory.35 However, this theory collides with the view that sover-
eignty resides in the people, and that government may interfere with the
people's "right to know" only when they consent, and that presidential
power to withhold information from the public is truly a narrowly lim-
ited "privilege" and not a right.3
Secondly, the court considered the nature of the material Marchetti
sought to disclose and determined that although "ordinary criminal
sanctions might suffice to prevent unauthorized disclosure of such infor-
mation . ..the risk of harm from disclosure is so great and mainte-
nance of the confidentiality of the information so necessary that greater
and more positive assurance is warranted." 37 In the Pentagon Papers
case the government also argued that it had a right to secrecy and that
disclosure of the information would be harmful.38 Perhaps a distinction
between the two cases can be found in the nature of the classified materi-
als involved. In the Pentagon Papers case the information concerned a
war which was a major national issue. The Supreme Court, therefore,
may have felt especially compelled to allow such information to flow
freely to the public. The Fourth Circuit may not have felt this same
12E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-22 (1936). There the
Court recognized the paramount role of the President in foreign affairs and the need for secrecy
in regard to information gathered by the President's "confidential sources." But the Court also
said that this executive power, like every other governmental power, "must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.' Id. at 320.
3466 F.2d at 1316. In enacting the Freedom of Information Act Congress recognized the
need for secrecy and provided that "[t]his section does not apply to matters that are-(l) specifi-
cally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign
policy ... " 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 306 (1972), established
the classification system that is currently in use.
3"466 F.2d at 1315.
"See Kutner, Freedom of Information: Due Process of the Right to Know, 18 CATHOLIC
LAW. 50, 52 (1972).
USee Hennings, Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 668-70,
770 (1959).
3466 F.2d at 1317 (emphasis added).
3403 U.S. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
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sense of urgency in regard to Marchetti's material. Also, the Pentagon
study covered decisions only up to the year 1968, while the classified
materials in Marchetti, if the secrecy agreement is taken literally, con-
cerned the "present and future security of the United States." 9
The chief distinction between the two cases, however, probably lies
in the court's third factor, the "position of trust and confidence" in
which the government placed Marchetti."° "Confidentiality inheres in
the situation and the relationship of the parties. Since information
highly sensitive to the conduct of foreign affairs and the national defense
was involved, the law would probably [have implied] a secrecy agree-
ment had there been no formally expressed agreement . "..."I' In the
Pentagon Papers case there was no confidential relationship between the
government and the newspapers involved. Had there been no such rela-
tionship in Marchetti, there is language in the Fourth Circuit's opinion
which indicates that the injunction would not have been affirmed:
"Moreover, the Government's need for secrecy in this area lends justifi-
cation to a system of prior restraint against disclosure by employees and
former employees of classified information obtained during the course
of employment."
42
The combination of these three factors enabled the government to
overcome the heavy presumption against the constitutionality of its
system of prior restraint. In balancing the governmental interest against
the first amendment rights involved, however, the court had to consider
whether a sufficient nexus existed between the secrecy interest and the
means by which the government sought to protect that interest. The
court found that it is reasonable for government agencies to protect
internal secrets through secrecy agreements with employes.43 Some
support and authority for this view can be found in Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers case.44 He felt that since the
President has the power to conduct foreign affairs and to maintain the
national defense, his responsibility is to insure that the confidentiality
necessary to carry out his duties receives protection.
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not base its determination that
this system of prior restraint is reasonable solely on the President's
'466 F.2d at 1312 n.l.
411d. at 1313.
4 Id. at 1316.
421d. at 1316-17 (emphasis added).
4 d. at 1316.
U403 U.S. at 729-30.
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inherent powers to preserve vital secrecy. The court said that "Congress
has imposed on the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility
for protecting intelligence sources and methods."45 Secrecy agreements
as a condition of employment are "entirely appropriate to a program
in implementation of the congressional direction of secrecy."46 Accord-
ing to Justice White's concurring opinion in the Pentagon Papers case,
an express congressional mandate would seem to be necessary: "[T]he
United States has not satisfied the very heavy burden that it must meet
to warrant an injunction against publication in these cases, at least in
the absence of express and appropriately limited congressional authori-
zation for prior restraints in circumstances such as these.
'47
Apparently the Fourth Circuit was satisfied that congressional au-
thorization plus inherent executive power had combined to enable the
government reasonably to require a prospective CIA employee to waive
his first amendment rights. This sanction given to the employment con-
tract may be usefully compared to the old and generally discredited
right-privilege distinction." The old notion was that government em-
ployment or the conferral of a government benefit was a privilege which
the government could take away without affording any procedural due
process. It has since been established that the termination of govern-
ment employment cannot be based upon an exercise of first amendment
rights by the employee. 9 Therefore, it seems arguable that the initial
grant of government employment cannot be based on the surrender of
first amendment rights.
The court insisted, however, that Marchetti, in signing a secrecy
agreement, did not surrender his first amendment right of free speech.50
"The agreement is enforceable only because it is not a violation of those
rights."'" Taken out of context, this statement could be interpreted as
meaning that there is no first amendment right to speak about material
which the government has designated as classified. But in the context
"1466 F.2d at 1316. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1970) reads: "IT]he Director of Central Intellig-
ence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclo-
sure . ...
4466 F.2d at 1316.
47403 U.S. at 731.
"6For a good analysis of the distinction and its constitutional implications, see Van Alstyne,
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1968).
"E.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
1466 F.2d at 1317.
51Id.
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of the entire decision and in light of Justice Brennan's analysis of the
nature of the classified material in the Pentagon Papers case,," the court
seems to have held that it is not a violation of a person's first amend-
ment rights to require that person to waive such rights as a condition
of government employment when disclosure of the information to which
the employee is exposed "may reasonably be thought to be inconsistent
with the national interest."53
In order to insure that the prohibition on expression is kept to a
minimum the court provided several safeguards. Feeling that undue
delay would impair the reasonableness of the restraint, the court set
thirty days as the maximum period in which the CIA should respond
after submission of material for approval. 4 The court further provided
that Marchetti, on his own initiative, could obtain judicial review of any
CIA action disapproving publication.5 5 It is certainly arguable that these
safeguards are inadequate. The CIA needs only to indicate whether or
not material submitted by Marchetti is classified. A few days would be
more than a reasonable amount of time in which to make such a deter-
mination. And though judicial review may be obtained, there are no set
time limits within which a decision must be handed down.
These inadequacies, however, are insubstantial when compared to
the limitations placed by the court upon the scope of judicial review.
"The issues upon judicial review would seem to be simply whether or
not the information was classified and, if so, whether or not, by prior
disclosure, it had come into the public domain."5 By imposing this
narrow restriction upon the scope of review, the court has foreclosed any
determination of whether such restraints prohibit the free and robust
discussion of public issues and personalities which is necessary to the
proper exercise of the people's function in the democratic process."
Since the court will look no further than the classified stamp on
the cover, material which may be merely embarrassing to a public offi-
5 Justice Brennan said that unlike obscene material, there was no question that the Pentagon
Papers material was within the first amendment's protection. 403 U.S. at 726.




"This was the Supreme Court's nain concern in Near. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
Similarly, in the licensing cases, the Court feared that a licensing official might arbitrarily deny
the license due to the content of the intended expression. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
This concern broadened in the obscenity cases, where the Court moved to prevent suppression of
protected expression. See text accompanying notes 20-26 supra.
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cial rather than essential to the national security or the sensitive aspects
of foreign affairs may remain undisclosed. The CIA has been relieved
of any burden of proving the necessity of the classification and prior
restraint. This conflicts with Justice Brennan's view58 that the first
amendment tolerates no prior restraints predicated upon conjecture that
untoward consequences may result. Accordingly, he urged that only
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a transport at sea can support the issuance of even an interim
restraining order.
The Fourth Circuit, however, is not without support for its determi-
nation that the process of classification is an executive function beyond
the scope of judicial review.59 An effective argument can be advanced
that it would be extremely difficult to recognize the importance of a
particular secrecy classification without knowledge of many other re-
lated secrets. "What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear
of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put
the questioned item of information in its proper context."'10 Yet the term
"classified" is very broad, and the court has perhaps swung the balance
too far in the direction of the governmental interest. More appropriate
might be a requirement that the government show that disclosure of the
material will "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable dam-
age to our Nation or its people.""
Judge Craven has suggested a possible compromise.12 A presump-
tion of reasonableness in favor of the government classification should
be established. The person challenging a classification would be required
to demonstrate that it is arbitrary and capricious before it could be
invalidated. This approach has the advantage of allowing inquiry into
the classification process. It has the serious disadvantage, however, of
shifting the burden of overcoming the heavy presumption to the person
desiring to exercise his first amendment freedom of speech.
In perspective the Marchetti decision is an unprecedented move-
ment toward the restriction of first amendment rights. It leaves open the
possibility that Marchetti's exercise of free speech will depend solely
"403 U.S. at 725-27.
"E.g., Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970).
1466 F.2d at 1318.
"1403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring).
0466 F.2d at 1318.
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upon the discretion of an executive official. In view of this danger the
recent denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court 3 is disappointing.
Hopefully, the determining factor in the denial was that no attempt to
restrain publication of specific material has yet been made. 4 If so, the
Court, upon actual submission of material and denial of authorization
to publish, could still determine that judicial review of the classification
system is necessary for the protection of our cherished freedoms of
speech and press.
KENNETH L. EAGLE
Consumer Protection-Disclosure of Cognovit Provisions as Security
Interests Under the Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act,' which became effective on July 1, 1969,
provides: "[I]t is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a meaningful
disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare
more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
uninformed use of credit.' 2 Pursuant to authority granted by the Act,3
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has published
Federal Reserve Board Regulation Z4 to implement the purposes of the
Act. Prior to the passage of the Truth in Lending Act, it was impossible
for most consumers to purchase credit in any rational or intelligent
manner5 The problem was not simply an inability to understand com-
plex finance charges, for consumers were (and still are) often intimi-
dated by the legalistic language that is so lavishly employed in both the
large and fine print of loan instruments.
Creditors often retain security interests' within the body of loan
-93 S. Ct. 553 (1972).
"4McCormick, Marchetti v. United States, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1972, at 21, cols. 5-6 (city
ed.).
,15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-65 (1970).
VId. § 160 1.
d.
112 C.F.R. Part 226 (1972).
5B. CLARK & J. FONESCA, HANDLING CONSUMER CREDIT CASES 137 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CLARK & FONESCA].
6 "Security interest" and "security" mean any interest in property which se-
cures payment or performance of an obligation. The terms include, but are not limited
to, security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code, real property mortgages,
[Vol. 51
